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Fletcher v. Peck and Constitutional
Development in the Early
United States
Gerald Leonard*
One hundred years after Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation
of the Constitution of the United States, few scholars attend actively to
that book or its specific claims. Yet it has become conventional
wisdom that the movement for a new Constitution in 1787 was no
democratic movement but a conservative effort to rein in the allegedly
reckless policy impulses of the state governments. Power would be
transferred substantially to the center, where an elite might better
control the direction of policy. This conservative movement had
important, Beardian economic dimensions, particularly its
determination to secure the rights of the propertied against the
supposed desires of the unpropertied to redistribute wealth.1 But
closely allied to this economic conservatism was necessarily a legal
conservatism, perhaps even a legal counterrevolution, as Aaron
Knapp’s essay for this Symposium argues.2 The Contracts Clause of
the new Constitution was only the most explicit protection in the
document for traditional rights of property and contract as against the
state governments’ demonstrated readiness to interfere with contract
performance and debt collection. The triumph of the Framers of 1787,
then, appears to some an abiding victory for a fundamentally
conservative structure of American law and a major defeat for serious
advocates of equality and democracy.3
*

Copyright © 2014 Gerald Leonard.
For an important modern statement of this point, see generally JENNIFER
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990).
2
Aaron Knapp, The Legal Counterrevolution: The Jurisprudence of Constitutional
Reform in 1787, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. (2014).
3
See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 5365 (1969) (demonstrating the elitism of the Constitution even as it formally rests on
popular sovereignty). See generally NEDELSKY, supra note 1.
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The truth, though, is that, for all the conservatism of 1787, the
framing and ratification constituted only one moment in the fluid
history of American constitutionalism. If the years before 1787
accommodated a widespread — though far from unanimous —
constitutional egalitarianism, the adoption of the Constitution
represented only a momentary defeat for that view.4 Ratification did
not send the egalitarians home to lick their wounds and never return.
Rather, a range of constitutionalisms survived ratification, all of them
now necessarily identifying themselves with the Constitution without
feeling obligated to take the Constitution’s conservatism as given. The
Constitution became subject to interpretation as soon as it went into
effect, and the years after 1789 revealed a multi-handed contest both
to control the meanings of particular provisions of the Constitution
and to locate the authoritative interpreters of the Constitution.
This Essay will sketch some of the main lines of struggle over
control of the Constitution in the first generation after ratification by
focusing on a single major issue, the Yazoo land scandal, which
brought out a range of theories of the Constitution and republican
authority, eventually generating the landmark Supreme Court case
Fletcher v. Peck,5 often said to be the first case in which the Supreme
Court struck down a state statute for unconstitutionality. The Yazoo
story began with the corrupt sale of millions of acres of Georgia public
lands in 1795, climaxed with the Fletcher case in 1810, and concluded
with congressional resolution of all claims in 1814. During these
years, Radical Republicans, moderate Jeffersonian Republicans,
Federalists, and the Supreme Court struggled to determine whether
the meaning of the Constitution belonged to the people themselves,
the people’s elected representatives, or the life-appointed justices of
the Supreme Court.
In the Yazoo fraud of 1795, companies of land speculators bribed
much of the Georgia legislature to execute a mammoth land sale —
most of present day Alabama and Mississippi — to the companies for a
mere $500,000.6 The speculators’ title was thus clouded by the flagrant
corruption and also by continuing Indian claims to much of the land,

4
See GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 18-19 (2002)
(explaining that the rise of the Jacksonian Democratic Party in the 1820s and 1830s
represented the ascendancy of constitutional egalitarianism two generations after
ratification of a designedly elitist Constitution).
5
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
6
C. PETER MAGRATH, YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF
FLETCHER V. PECK 3, 7 (1966).
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claims that could only be extinguished by the United States. In spite of
these clouds, the new owners went north and resold their claims to
purchasers who may or may not have been aware of the original fraud.
Meanwhile, in Georgia, a political movement arose to invalidate the
sale, and in 1796, a newly elected legislature passed “AN ACT
declaring null and void a certain usurped act,”7 that is, an act voiding
the prior land grant.
Georgia’s action — almost unintelligible to us today — asserted the
legislature’s right to review the constitutionality of legislation, without
recourse to the courts and regardless of the federal constitutional
protection for contracts. The 1796 Act was not a conventional repeal
but a finding and declaration that the 1795 Act had never been law. In
this respect, it foreshadowed Jefferson’s famous Kentucky Resolutions,
which (for all their differences) similarly insisted on a sovereign state’s
authority to legislatively declare a statute unconstitutional (in that
case, the federal Sedition Act) without recourse to the judiciary.8 The
Georgia rescinders (for lack of a better term) might thus have
expected the strong support of the Jeffersonian Republican Party,
defenders of states’ rights and extra-judicial constitutional
enforcement. But the Georgians had also provocatively challenged
some common law rules of contract. Their actions thus directly
assaulted not just Federalist constitutionalism but that of the moderate
parts of the Jeffersonian movement, which shared the Federalists’
reverence for common-law legalism. For that and other reasons, the
Republicans would split badly over the claims of the putatively
innocent northern purchasers of the Yazoo lands.
The more-radical Republicans defended Georgia’s actions in the
language of popular sovereignty and states’ rights. For them, such
popular constitutional review rested on even firmer footing than did
judicial review. The rescinding statute was not a mere legislative act.
Rather, it represented the will of the people themselves, who had
deputized their representatives to act in a special constitutional
capacity in response to exigent circumstances. Local resolutions
addressed to a state constitutional convention, declarations of grand
juries throughout the state, and popular meetings out of doors had
specially “invest[ed] this Legislature with conventional powers”; that
7
The Georgia Repeal Act of 1796, reprinted in MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 127-29
[hereinafter Georgia Repeal Act].
8
See Gerald Leonard, Jefferson’s Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CLASSICS: PATTERNS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT FROM JOHN FORTESCUE TO JEREMY
BENTHAM (D.J. Galligan ed., forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 21-22); see also
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 719-21 (1993).
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is, with the powers of the people themselves, as if assembled in
convention.9 The people of Georgia had thus exploited the wide
repertoire of “constitutional” options in the early nation to put their
sovereignty into practice.10 In so doing, the people and their delegates
in the legislature reviewed the original Act and declared the land grant
void — without effect from the moment of its supposed enactment —
on the basis of the fraud and other constitutional defects.
This apparently Jeffersonian expression of popular constitutional
review, however, proved controversial, even among Jeffersonians.
Jefferson, Madison, and a moderate minority of the Republican Party
would seek a compromise solution. For Federalists like John Marshall,
moreover, the notion of the people taking questions of legal
interpretation into their own hands perverted the Constitution.
Adjudication belonged in courts, just as legislation was delegated to
carefully designed legislatures. The people remained sovereign and so
elected their representatives and even amended the Constitution. But,
for Federalists, “popular sovereignty” must be bounded by law, by
close adherence to the traditions of the common law and to the courts’
commitment to reason rather than will.11 In this belief, they were not
far from Jefferson himself, whose First Inaugural insisted that the
people’s sovereign acts must not forsake reason for pure, popular
will.12 And they could point to the Constitution of the United States,
which placed the judicial power in the courts.13
The subsequent history of Yazoo played out as an extended series of
tactical moves by Georgia, by Congress, by the parties and their
leaders, by the President, and by the federal courts, navigating
between the democratic and the legalist approaches to the
Constitution with at least one eye on the whirl of practical politics. At
each step, the moves revealed important beliefs about the nature and
development of the Constitution but equally the inevitability that
constitutional development would rest on the imperatives of political
competition and pragmatic compromise, not mainly judicial
9

Georgia Repeal Act, supra note 7, at 135.
On the variety of means by which the people sought to exercise their
constitutional authority, see generally SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828 (1999); LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004).
11
See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 204-09 (2001).
12
THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address, in 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
148, 148-52 (1801), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~tjpapers/inaugural/infinal.html.
13
See U.S. CONST. art. III.
10
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reasoning. Soon after Georgia purported to void the sale and word
began to spread that the Indian claims might undermine it anyway, a
pamphlet war flared among the buyers and sellers of the Georgia
grants. A pamphlet by the South Carolina Federalist and participant in
the Yazoo speculation, Robert Goodloe Harper,14 drawing
reinforcement from an opinion letter of Alexander Hamilton,15 argued
that no legislature could void the enactments of a prior legislature.
Rather, “the force, validity, or meaning of a legislative act, is purely a
judicial question, and altogether beyond the province of the
legislature.”16 Moreover, “[t]his is a fundamental principle of all our
constitutions which declare, that the judicial and legislative powers
shall be distinct and separate. . . . As well might the legislature try
causes, or hear appeals, as attempt to expound, enforce, or declare
void, one of its own acts.”17 Further, even if the merits of the grant
were to be considered, Harper’s legalist view was that the grants were
manifestly contracts and that, “[i]t is an invariable maxim of law, and
of natural justice, that one of the parties to a contract, cannot by his
own act, exempt himself, from its obligation.” Even a state “could no
more relieve itself from the obligation, by any act of its own, than an
individual, who had signed a bond, could relieve himself from the
necessity of payment.”18 By such arguments, Harper and Hamilton
hoped to reassure the public of the validity of the grant and the
security of the claims then being sold and resold.
On the opposite side, Abraham Bishop wrote perhaps the most
famous anti-Yazoo pamphlet.19 Bishop was a Connecticut Republican
who evidently purchased a Yazoo claim substantially on credit. As he
came to realize the multiple shadows on his title, he wrote the
pamphlet as a polemic against the sellers who sought his remaining
payments, explaining the Republican defense of Georgia’s refusal to
recognize the grant. Starting with the assertion that Georgia had only
contingent claims to the land in the first place, given that Indian
nations remained in possession and that only the federal government
could legally dispossess them, Bishop then vindicated the authority of

14

See ROBERT GOODLOE HARPER, THE CASE OF THE GEORGIA SALES ON THE MISSISSIPPI
CONSIDERED, reprinted in MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 140-48.
15
See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, OPINION ON THE GEORGIA REPEAL ACT, reprinted in
MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 149-50.
16
MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 141.
17
Id. at 141-42.
18
Id. at 142.
19
See ABRAHAM BISHOP, GEORGIA SPECULATION UNVEILED, reprinted in MAGRATH,
supra note 6, at 152-71.
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the state of Georgia to void a grant previously made. He asserted that,
“This is the sovereign independent state of Georgia, having a right to
make or repeal their own laws at pleasure, and this right wholly
uncontrollable.” Moreover, the laws of Georgia “must be such as are
recognized by the people, legally represented.” To him, it was obvious
that “a legislature may declare a pretended act void” in any number of
circumstances: when pretended to be enacted in the absence of a
quorum; when the speaker or president of the body is bribed to
misrepresent the outcome of the vote; when necessary votes come
from those who have not taken prescribed oaths; and when the act
violates the constitution or the votes come from those materially
interested in the outcome. Such hypothetical and not so hypothetical
circumstances drove home the fundamental point that a state was not
the same as a private party to a contract but stood in a unique place. It
was an independent sovereignty that must be able to control the
question of what laws it had enacted and what “pretended acts” it
might repudiate as void and no act of the state at all. “Take this power
from a legislature, and where is the sovereignty of the state?”20
As to the common law doctrines that would supposedly rescue the
sellers of the Yazoo claims, Bishop lumped them with the many
“delusions” under which he thought the sellers to be laboring. The
notions that “a grant is in its nature irreversible” and that “bookprinciples relating to real estate and to notes are in favor of the
settlers” ran up against the more fundamental principles of
sovereignty: since the Revolution, each state had gained and never
relinquished sovereignty, Bishop presumed.21 Implicitly dismissing the
idea that the Constitution had subjected the states to contract law
enforceable in federal court, Bishop moved directly to the conclusion
that “an independent power can make, or unmake grants at will; because
no power can decide on the morality, equity, or policy of their
measures.”22 Be legal doctrine what it may, the reasonings of judges
and the traditions of the commercial law had only as much authority
as the unreviewable will of the people chose to give them. Even if the
sellers had all morality on their side, the fact would remain that the
sovereign power on the other side was “beyond their control.”23 And,
although Bishop’s polemic did not mention it, the Supreme Court’s
recent failure to vitiate the sovereignty of the states offered Bishop
good grounds for treating state sovereignty as a given. The Court had
20
21
22
23

MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 155.
See id. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
Id.
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attempted in Chisholm v. Georgia24 to render the states suable in
federal court and thus subject to the general law of contracts, only to
be soundly undone by the new Eleventh Amendment’s affirmation of
state sovereignty under the Constitution.25
The pamphlets helped set the terms of constitutional debate, but the
fate of the claimants and the lands fell to Congress. And the
Republicans in Congress were divided both by constitutional
principles and by competing views of how to maintain the ascendancy
of republicanism in the face of the continuing threat of Federalist
aristocracy. In 1802, Congress made the Yazoo problem its own by
negotiating Georgia’s cession of any claims it had to the territory
(much has it had negotiated cession of western lands from several
other states) in return for a payment of $1.25 million, also reserving 5
million acres of the territory as a fund to satisfy any outstanding
claims.26 At the same time, Congress created a commission of cabinet
luminaries (Secretary of State James Madison, Secretary of the
Treasury Albert Gallatin, and Attorney General Levi Lincoln) to
investigate the claims to the territory and propose a resolution.
Constituting most of Jefferson’s cabinet, these commissioners can
fairly be seen as representing the views of Jefferson as well as
themselves. The commissioners transmitted their report to Congress
in February 1803.27 In the report, these legalists avoided vindicating
popular constitutional control and distanced themselves from the idea
that “the Legislature of the State of Georgia was competent” to void
the land grant. At the same time, they expressed “no hesitation” in
agreeing with Georgia that “the title of the claimants cannot be
supported.” Still, the commissioners departed from the Georgian view
on what to do with the claims. Notwithstanding the claimants’ lack of
title, the commissioners “nevertheless, believe that the interests of the
United States, the tranquility of those who may hereafter inhabit that
territory, and various equitable considerations which may be urged in
favor of most of the present claimants, render it expedient to enter
into a compromise on reasonable terms.”28
The commissioners did not explain further, but they had committed
themselves to a few propositions: first, that the doctrine of states’
24

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 188-202 (1995).
26
See MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 35.
27
Id. at 36.
28
JAMES MADISON, ALBERT GALLATIN & LEVI LINCOLN, GEORGIA LAND CLAIMS, H.R.
DOC. NO. 7-74 (Feb. 16, 1803), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS
120, 122 (Walter Lowrie ed., 1834).
25
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rights probably did not go so far as to authorize a legislature to break
the contract of a prior legislature, even if, second, the Yazoo claimants
could not in fact sustain their “titles” under the law; and, third, many
of the current claimants, lacking timely notice of the fraud, might have
equitable claims of some sort — of a sort that might be recognized in
court, presumably — even if what they bought was never actually
good title. The report thus tried to straddle the positions of different
parts of the Republican Party, opening room for political compromise
on a question that the populist, states’-rights Radicals and the legalist
Federalists both saw as a matter of pure constitutional principle. For
the moderate Republicans, compromise was essential for multiple
reasons: because they were sympathetic both to the populist principles
of the Radicals and to the legalism of the Federalists; and because, as a
practical matter, the party needed to conciliate powerful New England
Republicans, who were deeply invested in Yazoo claims at the same
time that they were indispensable to the ongoing dismantling of
Federalist hegemony in its strongest region.29
For John Randolph, Virginia’s radical leader of the House
Republicans,30 however, principles of states’ rights and popular
sovereignty were more important than the conciliation of nominal,
New England Republicans. The latter relied on characteristically
Federalist arguments to legitimate their morally corrupt claims. So
these radicals, who generally could command a majority of the party
but only a minority of the House, firmly opposed any compromise. To
indulge any Yazoo claims at all and to disrespect the Georgia
legislature’s reviewing authority was to bow to the legalist position
that state and popular sovereignty must yield to judge-made
commercial law.
Congress had set aside 5 million acres of the Georgia cession for the
purpose of settling claims to those lands in whatever way it ultimately
chose. In early 1804, the House returned to the commissioners’
proposal that the government settle with the Yazoo claimants. Now
Randolph drew a line in the sand, proposing a series of resolutions to
the effect that “no part of the five millions of acres . . . shall be
appropriated to quiet or compensate any claims derived under any act,
or pretended act, of the State of Georgia” of 1795. The resolutions
insisted on the radical proposition that legislators are always subject to
the people’s overruling of their acts whenever they should stray from
“the public good.” When legislators act “to promote their own private
29

See MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 30-31, 38-47.
See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS
YOUNG REPUBLIC 19-20 (1971); id. at 39-49.
30
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ends,” then “it is the inalienable right of a people . . . to revoke the
authority thus abused, to resume the rights thus attempted to be
bartered, and to abrogate the act thus endeavoring to betray them.”31
There were at least two major problems with this assertion. First, the
claim that the people could override the doings of the legislature
contradicted the legalist notion that established principles of contract
law as well as established principles of constitutional law limited what
the people could do. But, second, even those who accepted the right of
the people at any time to reclaim all delegated power and repudiate the
contracts of their legislature still had to explain how one could tell
when the people — as opposed to self-appointed demagogues — had
spoken in this way. Nevertheless, Randolph confidently asserted that it
was “the good people of Georgia, impressed with general indignation,”
who voided the act, choosing for their mechanism the subsequent
legislature’s rescinding act, enacted “under circumstances of peculiar
solemnity, and finally sanctioned by the people, who have subsequently
ingrafted it on their constitution . . . .”32 The “circumstances of peculiar
solemnity” were not explained, but Randolph presumably referred not
only to whatever mood hung over the capital as the legislature exercised
its “conventional powers” but also to the collected acts of popular
resistance to the original act, via grand juries, public gatherings, and the
like.33 These doings, combined with the fact that the new Georgia
Constitution of 1798 subsequently ratified the voiding of the original
grant, were enough to demonstrate to Randolph’s satisfaction that the
voiding of the grant was the act of the sovereign people.34 And, indeed,
it seems fair to say that, if ever the people of a state stepped forward
generally and unambiguously to vitiate an official act, then the people of
Georgia did so in 1795. In all of the long congressional debate on the
subject, no one (to my knowledge) tried to argue otherwise. Rather,
defenders of the Yazoo claims merely insisted that, be the circumstances
what they were, the Georgia legislature could never step into the shoes
of a court to void a contract.
When debate resumed on Randolph’s resolutions some days later,
on March 7, 1804, Randolph sketched the current state of parties in
the House, explaining that the hopeless minority of Federalists had
successfully divided and conquered the huge majority that were the
Republicans, manufacturing for the purpose disingenuous states’rights arguments in favor of the compromise. The defenders of the
31
32
33
34

13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1039 (1804).
Id. at 1039-40.
See Georgia Repeal Act, supra note 7, at 135-36.
See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1039-40.
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land sale now insisted that for Congress to question the validity of the
1795 grant would be to invade the prerogatives of a sovereign state.
An amused Randolph sardonically celebrated the Federalists’
conversion to states’ rights principles before ridiculing the idea that
recognition of the Yazoo claims would properly respect states’ rights.
Georgia itself had declared the invalidity of the putative statute, and
states’-rights principles commanded Congress to respect that
determination, not the prior fraud. Moreover, Randolph explained
that, in instructing the commissioners on the scope of their authority
to recognize and compromise this or that claim, the House could not
avoid determining that the claims either had or had not a basis in law.
Any indulgence of the claims amounted to a legitimation of the 1795
grant and a congressional striking down of the 1796 declaration of
unconstitutionality. The only rightful course available to the House,
therefore, was to avoid such legitimation by recognizing Georgia’s own
absolute voiding of all claims under the corrupt Yazoo grant. Here, he
again outlined the evidence that this voiding was indeed the act of the
state as a whole, supported by an allegedly unanimous people and
subsequently enshrined in the state constitution itself.35
The House ultimately voted to postpone any consideration of the
resolutions and returned to the Yazoo issue in its next session, almost
a year later. Randolph again took the lead for the Radicals, arguing
that the law was on his side, but more importantly insisting that, even
if it was not, the Yazoo claims constituted such an exceptional case
that “municipal jurisprudence” could not be applied but only “first
principles”: “Attorneys and judges do not decide the fate of empires.”36
The case might be about land titles, but it did not belong in court.
Rather, it belonged in the hands of the people of Georgia, who had
already lived up to their responsibilities and declared the law void.
In contrast to Randolph’s high-flying rhetoric, moderate Republican
advocates of compromise insisted that the proposal did not involve the
eternal fate of republicanism in its struggle with Federalist aristocracy.
Rather, a compromise would simply reflect the fact that the claimants
had just enough color to their legal claims that it behooved the United
States to settle with them and remove the clouds on a vast tract of
land. Thus, Representative James Elliot of Vermont, declaring himself
as much a democratic republican as any in the House,37 noted that the
35

Id. at 1109-11.
14 ANNALS OF CONG. 1029-30 (1805).
37
See id. at 1041. Magrath labels Elliot a Federalist, but the available evidence
suggests the accuracy of Elliot’s own declaration that he was a Republican. See Eugene
L. Huddleston, Indians and Literature of the Federalist Era: The Case of James Elliot, 44
36
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Georgia cession and Congress’s embrace of that cession certainly
contemplated a pragmatic settlement of the claims. The matter was
simple:
We are about to make arrangements for carrying into effect a
solemn stipulation in the treaty with Georgia, and a solemn act
of our predecessors, by devoting a part of the five millions of
acres, specially reserved for that purpose . . . to the
extinguishment of the colorable claims of equitable
claimants.38
Extended debate over four days ended in seeming victory for the
compromisers. The House voted by a small margin to endorse a report
of the Committee of Claims that had recommended the appointment
of a new commission with authority to settle the claims with finality.39
Yet, when the Committee later reported a bill to implement that
resolution, the House ignored it.
Debates over the Yazoo claims would resurface in the next Congress
as well, but the radicals always maintained enough strength to prevent
any authorization of a settlement. The Yazooists consequently turned
their attention to the courts. In fact, the collusive suit of Fletcher v.
Peck had been pending without action in federal court in
Massachusetts since June 1803.40 The parties were the buyer and seller
of claims to substantial Yazoo lands, Fletcher nominally challenging
Peck’s title. But, in reality, both hoped for a ruling that the claims were
good so that Peck could sell and Fletcher could buy with profit to
both. No one in the case sought to argue earnestly that the titles were
invalid. But the suit did not move forward in 1803 or for the next
several years. At that time, the Radicals were aggressively impeaching
Federalist judges, convicting one in the Senate before coming up just
short of conviction of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1805.41
It stands to reason that the Yazooists preferred to await the outcome of
their claims in Congress, supported by the Administration, rather than
press forward for vindication by judges who would be looking over
their shoulders at an aggressive, anti-legalist Congress. By 1806,
however, Congress had repeatedly failed to produce a compensation
NEW ENG. Q. 221, 231-32 & n.44 (1971).
38
14 ANNALS OF CONG. 1041.
39
Id. at 1173.
40
Lindsay G. Robertson, “A Mere Feigned Case”: Rethinking the Fletcher v. Peck
Conspiracy and Early Republican Legal Culture, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 249, 252-53.
41
See generally ELLIS, supra note 30, at 69-107 (detailing the events of Judge
Pickering and Justice Chase’s impeachment proceedings).
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law, and the threat of impeachment of federal judges had withered
with Chase’s acquittal. The courts newly looked like the most eligible
avenue for the Yazoo claimants, and so the Fletcher case was finally
tried to a pro-Yazoo conclusion. But that was only the first step, since
only a Supreme Court endorsement of that result would apply
nationwide and have the sort of influence in Congress that the
Yazooists wanted.42
After years of efforts to compromise claims of between 35 and 50
million acres for a mere 5 million acres, the case would now go up to
the Supreme Court with at least the formal potential to grant the
Yazooists the entire, vast tract of land. And when the case got to the
Court, it found a Chief Justice who was himself both a seasoned land
speculator and a vigorous common-law legalist.43 Although three of
the five justices who would decide the case were Jefferson appointees,
they generally shared Marshall’s legalism and yielded to his view of the
case.44
Marshall’s opinion45 largely recapitulated the legalist arguments that
had been made at length by the pro-compromise members of
Congress. Marshall insisted that the land grant was a contract within
the meaning of the federal Contracts Clause. He then offered a kind of
back-handed respect to state sovereignty by disregarding the charges
of corruption. The Court would not disregard a statute bearing all the
forms of a Georgia law.46 Of course, there was essentially no doubt
that, in the most innocent version of events, the 1795 legislators had
sold much of the state’s land to themselves, and further that Georgia
had already decided for itself that the 1795 Act was no law. But, for
Marshall, the people of a state had no power to say what its law was.
The people, he insisted, could only act through their constitutionally
authorized agents,47 not on their own. The task of declaring the law
was for judges, not the people, and no court could recognize an
attempt to “devest” property rights in the name of a state. Rather,
“certain great principles of justice,” “those rules which would have
regulated the decision of a judicial tribunal,” must always govern, and

42
See MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 50-59 (describing the Yazooists’ likely
calculations).
43
NEWMYER, supra note 11, at 36-38.
44
MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 63. The Jeffersonian Justice Johnson did write a
separate concurrence of some interest, but it did not substantially deviate from
Marshall’s legalism.
45
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
46
Id. at 129-31.
47
Id. at 132-33.
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those rules included the rule of equity that protected good faith
purchasers, even when sold a defective title.48 To suppose otherwise,
Marshall argued, was to disregard the law and usurp the place of the
judiciary, thus ignoring the very nature and limits of legislative power
and the principle of separation of powers.49 Moreover, recognition of
the legislative voiding of the sale would flout the federal Constitution’s
“bill of rights for the people of each state”; that is, the Contracts
Clause, as well as the bans on bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws.50 To Marshall and other Federalists, Georgia’s legislature
exhibited exactly the vices of the legislatures of the 1780s, the very
legislative vices that the Constitution had been designed to prevent.
The Yazooists’ resounding judicial victory, however, did not put
money in their pockets. Various obstacles remained to their claiming
and reselling land that was in a distant location and that, in many
cases, already had settlers on it. So they returned to Congress once
again.51 There, the Court’s opinion no doubt had some influence, but
no one considered actually implementing the logical remedy implied
by the court — recognition of the full title of the claimants to the vast
area that would soon constitute most of Alabama and Mississippi.
Rather, while Radical Republican orthodoxy continued to impede the
progress of a compensation bill, the imperative of facilitating
settlement finally overcame the lingering congressional doubts about
the “‘strict legality’ of the claimants’ title.”52 In 1814, Congress at last
enacted a compensation law, appropriating the long-reserved 5 million
acres for the purpose of settling the claims. The Yazooists, for their
part, unhesitatingly accepted this roughly one-eighth compensation
for the “titles” that the Court had impotently recognized.53
Fletcher had thus failed to control the question of the Yazoo claims,
proving the Court just one of several important sources of legal and
constitutional meaning. But it illuminated the range of
constitutionalisms available in the generation after ratification of the
Constitution. For the heirs of the most radical Antifederalists, the
events in Georgia enacted the true meaning of popular sovereignty.
Moderate Republicans, however, embraced a pragmatic legalism,
defending all at once the forms of law, states’ rights, and pragmatic
political compromise. For moderates, unorthodox manifestations of
48
49
50
51
52
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“popular sovereignty” were not the way to go, but neither was
unthinking deference to the courts. Rather, Congress had its own
important role in giving operative meaning to the Constitution, just as
the Court had its role. In the Yazoo case, for example, Congress
attended to lawyerly considerations, both to doubt the “strict legality”
of the original sale and at the same time to respect the grounds on
which the Court defended the equitable claims of innocent purchasers.
But that did not mean that Congress would simply defer to a judicial
perspective on the claims. Rather, it sought to settle the legal and
constitutional claims in the political arena, recognizing but
compromising both the legal claims of the Yazooists and the claims to
sovereignty of Georgia and the American people more generally.
On the Supreme Court and among the Federalists, common-law
legalism reigned. The Court deemed itself the only legitimate and
reliable source of legal interpretation. And it used its special status to
sanctify those rights of property and contract that it thought the
foundation of civilization as well as the core values of the Constitution
itself. To Marshall, Fletcher’s importance lay not in its pioneering
invalidation of a state law but in its vindication of a legalist, commonlaw Constitution.
In sum, the original Constitution had indeed represented an
important victory for the conservative forces of 1787–1788, but the
story of the Yazoo scandal and Fletcher v. Peck demonstrates that that
victory carried only so far. While Marshall, the Federalists, and the
Supreme Court did all in their power to vindicate the common-law
Constitution of contract and property rights along with judicial
supremacy, they could not control the meaning of the Constitution in
practice. The radical heirs of the Antifederalists gained office in large
numbers, ultimately driving the ascendancy of the Jacksonian
Democratic Party and the marginalization of the Court.54 And, as the
Yazoo events illustrated, they insisted on a populist Constitution that
empowered the people to override the doings of their legislatures and
their courts alike, determining for themselves when their agents had
strayed from their delegated tasks and reserving to themselves the final
authority to say what the law was and to dispose of legal claims.
Meanwhile, the moderate, legalist Republicans insisted on a
Constitution that neither resorted to direct popular control of legal
54
See generally LEONARD, supra note 4 (describing the ascent of the two party
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claims nor erased popular will in deference to judicial claims of special
expertise. Rather, consistent with Jefferson’s famously departmentalist
approach to constitutional interpretation,55 all branches of government
and the people themselves had rightful claims to interpret the
Constitution when acting within their legitimate spheres. The people
of Georgia might instruct their legislature to disregard an act they
disapproved. Marshall and the Court would necessarily interpret the
law and the Constitution when resolving Fletcher’s claim against Peck,
however feigned. But none of that prevented Congress too from
stepping in to take the larger, national view of the controversy and
interpose a statutory settlement of all claims. That settlement became
final not because the courts or the people were constitutionally
required to accede to Congress’s will but because, by 1814, the nation
was finally ready to accept that settlement. Future constitutional
controversies, similarly, might be settled by popular movements, by
state action, by congressional action, or by the courts, as
circumstances dictated. But no dogma of constitutional authority —
including Marshall’s insistence that the Constitution had granted
supremacy to the Supreme Court56 — would ever grasp final victory.

55
See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 30, at 66 (describing Jefferson’s view that each branch
is empowered to decide constitutional issues).
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Beyond the implications of Fletcher on this point, see McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-01 (1819).

